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1.  Introduction 
  In the last two decades, social insurance taxes for health care and long-term care insurances 
have been raised repeatedly in Japan to pay for the increasing costs of benefits for  its  aging 
population. Almost all the laws governing the social insurance programs for the employed workers 
mandate the firms to contribute one half of the social insurance taxes, leaving the rest to their 
employees. Recent increases in employer’s contributions, most firms complain, have been draining 
corporate profits, and hurting their competitiveness in international markets. If these rates keep on 
increasing, the firms will eventually have to close many domestic production  sites or move them to 
other countries, most probably to China. These claims have to be examined carefully, however, as the 
firms are capable of reducing workers wages or salaries by the increase in employer’s contributions 
and maintain the labor costs constant. In other words, employer’s contributions can be shifted and 
borne ultimately by the workers.   
Japan has been financing most of the bulging costs of the health care for the elderly, not by the 
general tax revenue, but by the social insurance taxes of the employed workers. Many economists, 
including the present authors, have been critical of this financing policy because it puts too much 
burden on the working generation, and they recommend replacing it by consumption tax, at least 
part of which is borne by the elderly. If the employer’s contributions are in fact absorbed, or at least a 
significant part is borne, by the corporate profits, we may have to adjust our prescription for an 
equitable financing too. Under the circumstance, the affluent elderly, who own a large part of the 
corporate stocks, bear most, or a significant proportion, of their own health care costs in the form of a 
lower rate of return on their stock investment.   
  This problem is a part of the general problem known as the incidence analysis of social insurance 
taxes. As we will see shortly, the incidence of social insurance taxes on wages or salaries depends 
theoretically on the price elasticity of demand for labor and the price elasticity of supply of labor. 
Thus how much of the past increases in social insurance taxes have been shifted to labor is primarily 
an empirical question. In this paper, based on a representative Japanese survey data on 
wages/salaries, we will analyze the incidence of employer’s contributions for health insurance and 
long-term care insurances.   
   
2.  Preceding    Studies   
According to a simple economic theory, the incidence of employer’s contributions for social 
insurance depends  on the elasticity of demand and supply curves. Thus economists regard the  
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problem as primarily an empirical issue.   
There are a significant number of studies concerning the incidence of employer’s contributions for 
the U.S. and the countries in Europe. For example, Brittain(1971),  Vorman(1974), and 
Holmlund(1983) have analyzed the effects of social insurance taxes on the wages and employment, 
using aggregated data. According to these results, almost all or at least half of the social insurance 
contributions are shifted to employees in the form of reduced wage rates.  In the 1990’s, economists 
have started using microdata for such an analysis, and in order to avoid endogeneity bias they relied 
on exogenous changes in social insurance contributions as a result of reforms in social insurance 
programs. They include such studies as Gruber and Krueger(1991), Gruber(1994), Gruber(1997), and 
Anderson and Meyer(2000), most of which confirm the shifting of employer’s contributions to the 
workers. Most recently, Sommers(2005) has analyzed the incidence problem in conjuction with wage 
rigidity.   
In Japan, the number of empirical studies on this problem is limited. The examples are 
Tachibanaki and Yokoyama(2008)、Komamura and Yamada(2004)、Iwamoto and Hamaaki（2006）, 
Sakai and Kazekami（2007）. Tachibanaki and Yokoyama(2008) analyzed the macro time series data 
of social insurance taxes and wage data, found no statistically significant negative correlation 
between them, and concluded that social insurance taxes are not shifted on the workers. Komamura 
and Yamada (2004) analyzed the data of health insurance associations, and found that most of the 
employer’s contributions are shifted on the workers in the form of lower wages. Iwamoto and 
Hamaaki（2006）provided a theoretical  model  and  an empirical survey of the  literature on the 
incidence problem, and they pointed out, among other things, that the results in the existing studies 
are susceptible to the endogeneity bias of employer’s contributions. Sakai and Fujin  （2007）  used 
aggregated data to analyze the incidence problem, but took advantage of the introduction of the Long 
Term Care Insurance as a natural experiment. They have found that after LTCI was introduced, 
relative wages of male workers who had to start paying for LTCI insurance taxes have gone down, 
possibly due to the shifting of employer’s contribution in the LTCI.   
 
3.  The Model 
Before going into the empirical estimation, we will present analytical frameworks for the incidence 
of the employer’s contributions to social insurance using simple theoretical models. As a point of 
departure, we will present a standard one-sector model, and then we will frame the problem in a 
model with two labor markets, one for regular workers, and the other for irregular workers.     
 
3.1  Standard Model   
  The tax incidence is usually analyzed in a standard model using a linear demand function and a 
linear supply function. The demand for labor is given as    
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w D 1 0 α α + =
, 
and the supply of labor is given as 
      w S 1 0 β β + =
, 
where D stands for the demand for labor, S stands for the supply of labor,                and w stands for 
the wage rate.   
Let us assume that a social insurance tax equal to τ is imposed on the employer. The employer now 
finds the cost of unit labor as  ( ) τ + w , paying w to the workers, and τ to the government. As a result, 
the demand for labor now is expressed as   
( ) τ α α + + = w D 1 0             （3） 
In a market equilibrium, demand equals supply, and hence we have the following equilibrium 
condition, 
( ) w w 1 0 1 0 β β τ α α + = + + .         (4） 
Solving this condition for w, we obtain the reduced form equation for wage rate. Denoting the 
determinants of wage rates other than the social insurance tax by x1,x2,..,xn, we have the reduced 
form equation for the wage rate that needs to be estimated; 
       
 
w = γ0 + γ1x1 + ...+ γnxn +δτ.          (4a) 
Naturally, we are interested in the sign and the magnitude of delta, the coefficient of tau. 
Differentiating both sides of (4) by tau, we have   










1 1 1 .            （5） 
Collecting the terms, we have   








              （6） 
 
Since we have α1<0  and  β1>0  from the properties of demand and supply functions, we have 
0 < ∂ ∂ τ w ,  or, the wage rate paid to the workers will be reduced as the social insurance tax 
payment increases. For a unit increase of the insurance tax, the magnitude of reduction in the wage 
rate depends on the ratio of α1 to (α1-β1), or on (1-β1/α1). If the demand elasticity α1 is much larger than 
supply elasticity β1 in absolute values, then |β1/α1| will be smaller, and the ratio will be closer to 1. 
However, if the supply elasticity is large compared with the demand elasticity, then the ratio may be 
substantially smaller than 1. Realistically speaking, in labor market, workers have to choose a firm 
from a relatively limited number of firms, but firms can choose a worker from a large number of 
workers with the same ability but with different reservation wages. As a result, we expect the firms  
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to be far more sensitive to wage rates than the workers, or α1 will be much larger than β1. This is the 
reason why, in the context of a standard market model, we expect the wages to absorb most of the 
social insurance taxes.   
 
3.2  Model with a Market for Irregular Workers 
 
  In the standard model, the increase in the employer’s contribution of the social insurance tax 
automatically leads to the increase in unit labor cost. In addition to these regular workers, however, 
firms in Japan and in many other countries have an option of employing irregular workers who are 
exempt from the social insurance. By increasing the employment of irregular workers, firms can 
reduce the increase in the employer’s contributions. We will take account of the effects on irregular 
workers and analyze the incidence of employer’s contributions of social insurance tax.    
Since the market for regular workers and the market for irregular workers are interdependent, we 
will write the demand and supply of the regular workers in log-linear forms; 
 
) , (
t f f f w w d d =                       (7) 
 
) , (
t f f f w w s s =            (8) 
 
where df is the demand for regular workers, sf is the supply of regular workers, wf is the wage rate of 
regular workers, wt is the wage rate of irregular workers.   
Let us assume now that social insurance tax T is imposed on the firm. To make the analysis 
simpler, let us assume that the firm has to pay the government a fixed proportion τ of the wage rate 
paid to each regular worker, but nothing for irregular workers. Under the assumption, the cost of a 
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has to hold, and hence we have, 
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Furthermore, since the demand and supply functions have to be homogenous of degree zero,
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Likewise, in the market equilibrium for irregular workers, 
t t s d = has to hold, and hence we have 
 
        ) , ( ) , (
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We have a system of two equations, but only one relative price (wf/wt) to solve the system. This is 
because the two equations, (9) and (10), are not independent because of Walrus Law. One simple way 
to solve the system explicitly is to assume that the two kinds of labor are perfect substitutes and that 
total supply is fixed.  For example, if the sum of the two labor supplies must be a constant, L, then 
we can solve the following condition for (wf/wt);   
 















.        (11)
 
 
This condition has an extra advantage in that we can use (11) even when the market for regular 
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We will write this reduced-form equilibrium condition (11) as follows;     
   
    ( ) i
t f w w ε τ γ β ′ + + ′ = 2 0 ln  
 
 
In Figure  1, we have analyzed the markets for regular workers and irregular workers 
simultaneously. On the common vertical axis, the relative wage rate of regular workers to that of 
irregular workers  ) / (
t f w w is measure. On the horizontal axis of the first quadrant, quantities of 
regular workers are measured from origin to the right, and on the horizontal axis of the second 
quadrant, quantities of irregular workers are measured from origin to the left. Firstly, a higher 
relative wage rate of regular workers increases the supply of regular workers, but  reduces the 
demand for them. Hence we have an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping demand 
curve in the first quadrant. Secondly, a higher relative wage rate of regular workers increases the 
demand for   irregular workers but reduces the supply of  irregular workers. Hence we have an 
upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping demand curve in the second quadrant.   
Let us now assume that the government increased the employer’s contribution for social insurance. 
At any given relative wage rate, the increase in the employer’s contribution increases the relative  
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unit cost of labor of regular workers to that of irregular workers, and hence it reduces the demand for 
regular workers. Consequently, the demand curve shifts downward in the first quadrant. 
What will happen in the second quadrant when the social insurance contribution is increased? At 
any given relative wage rate, the higher unit cost of labor imposes the firm to secure higher marginal 
product of labor from their  regular workers. But  assuming that regular workers and irregular 
workers are substitutes, in the firm, the marginal product of labor of irregular workers must be 
higher, too. Thus the firm must be willing to hire more irregular workers at a given relative wage 
rate.  Consequently,  in the second quadrant, the demand curve for irregular workers shifts 
downward.   
Combining the changes in the two markets, in Figure 1, the increase in employer’s contribution 
induces a  reduction  in  the  employment of regular workers,  an  increase in the employment of 
irregular workers, and a    decrease in the relative wage rate of regular workers.     
 
 
4.  Estimation Model and Data   
 
4.1 Estimation Model 
 
  In what follows, we will provide an empirical analysis on the incidence of the contributions for 
the health care insurance and long term care insurance by using micro data of “Employment Status 
Survey” and “Annual Business Report” of society-managed employment-based health insurance. In 
the empirical incidence literature of social insurance taxes/fees of Japan, all the previous studies 
have relied on the aggregated wage data, but, as far as we know, none has used micro data yet. By 
using a large-scale, national micro data on wages, we will be able to have more precise estimates of 
the social insurance fees/taxes, by a better  control  of  the  attributes of individual workers, the 
characteristics of firms, the regions, and the industry.    The basic specification of the wage equation 
in our model is given as follows; 
 
     i j i i X w ε τ γ β β + + + = 1 0 ln ,                (12） 
where wi is the wage rate of worker i, ln wi is the logarithm of wi. and β0 is the constant term, Xi is a 
vector of such individual attributes as age, sex, education,    size of the workforce, the industry, the 
region of the location, respectively of the firm the individual works, and τj is employer’s contribution 
rate of health and long term care that individual belongs. If the coefficient γ1 is negative, then we 
know that the employer’s contributions for the two social insurances are shifted to the employees. In 
Employment Status Survey, regarding the firm the individual works, information is available about  
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the industry, the rough classification of the size of its total employment, and the region of its location, 
but  not the exact identity of the firm.  For this reason,  instead of using the individual firm’s 
contribution rates, we first computed the average of the employer’s contribution rate of all the firms 
in each industry in each region, and used the average rates for all the firms of a given industry in a 
given region as their contribution rates. 
   
  Although the equation given by (12) is a standard textbook specification in an incidence analysis, 
it fails to take account of the developing duality of changes    that have been taking place in the labor 
market of Japan; the number of regular workers has been decreasing rapidly but the number of 
irregular workers has been increasing equally rapidly. Suppose that an employer, instead of reducing 
regular worker’s wage rate by a constant percentage across the board, replaces  less  productive 
regular workers with irregular workers. Such a substitution may involve some productivity loss to 
the employer, but presumably, some of it, or most of it, will be taken care of by the differential unit 
labor costs of the two types of workers. By replacing enough number of regular workers, the employer 
may even be able to keep the wage rates of regular workers intact and keep the total labor costs 
unchanged, in spite of the increased  contribution rates of the employer.  For this case, the 
specification in (12) will not find any incidence on wages.   
  If we take the income from a standardized unit of labor as a criterion, the substitution of a regular 
worker by an irregular worker will involve a substantial reduction in the income, and hence the 
increased social insurance contribution should involve a very significant incidence on labor income. 
For this reason, we consider effects of irregular workers, and we formulate estimation model as 
follow; 
 
    ( ) i j i j i X wt w ε τ γ β β ′ + + ′ + ′ = 2 0 ln         （13） 
 
where wtj is the average wage of irregular workers in industry j to which    individual i belongs. 
Other notations are identical to those in (12). By estimating the equation (13), we can analyze the 
effects of employer’s contributions on the relative wage rate of regular worker i to the average wage 
rate of irregular workers in the same industry. If γ2 is negative, the employer rein in the wage growth 
of regular workers lower than that of irregular workers. In this case, we can interpret as incidence of 
employer’s contribution to regular workers wage. 
  We use those estimation models and above-mentioned data, and analyze empirically incidence of 
employer’s contribution of health and long term care in Japan. 
 




The data on individual wage rates used in our analysis are obtained from XX% samples of the three 
waves of “Employment Status Survey” (1992, 1997 and 2002). The contributions data for health care 
insurance and long term care insurance are taken from the Annual Business Report of the National 
Federation of Health Insurance Societies of the same years. 
The annual income, annual worked days and weekly worked hours are given as categorical data in 
the Survey, and we have used their medium values to represent each individual12
We have shown the important descriptive statistics in Table 2. The average annual income is 5,869 
thousand, wage per hour is 2,954.8 yen. The combined employer’s contribution rate of health care and 
long term care is 4.83%. In terms of education achievement, the proportion of elementary or junior 
high school graduate is 7%, that of high school graduate is 52.2%, and that of collage or graduate 
school graduate is 10.8%. In terms of age, average is 38.94.   
. We have used log 
of hourly wage as explained variable, and hourly wage was calculated as follows: hourly wage = 
individual annually income ÷ (annual worked days × hours worked per week ÷ 5). We made dummy 
variables for sex (male, female), education levels (elementary or junior high school graduate, high 
school graduate, junior college or technical college graduate, college or graduate school graduate), 
occupations (profession or engineer, management position, clerical post, sales people, service, peace 
preservation, agriculture and forestry and fishery, traffic and communications, digging and 
manufacture and construction and non-office worker), and six regions (Hokkaido and Tohoku, Kanto, 
Hokuriku and Tokai,  Kinki,  Chugoku and Shikoku,  Kyusyu and Okinawa).  Since industry 
classification of the  Business Report is far  more  detailed than those in the Survey, we took  a 
weighted average of employer’s contribution rates of the industries in the Business Report using the 
number of employees of the each industry as weights to compute the industry contribution rates of 
the Survey. 
 
5.  Estimation Results   
 
Let us first show the OLS estimation result of the relationship between the wage rate of regular 
workers and the employer’s contributions for health care insurance and long term care insurance 
(TTTT). In the column (1), we have used individual income per hours as the dependent variable. Our 
estimation result shows that the coefficient of the employer’s contribution rate is negative, but not 
statistically significant.   
Next, in column (2), we have shown the estimation result with the relative wage as the dependent 
                                                 
1 In terms of annual income, category of 15 million yen over is set as 15 million yen. In annual 
worked days, category of 250 days over is set as 250 days. In terms of week worked time, category of 
60 hours over is set as 60 hours.   
2 In terms of working periods, category of 30 years over is set as 360 months.  
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variable. The relative wage rate used are obtained as the ratio of individual income per hours of 
regular workers to the average income per hours of irregular workers in the same industry and in the 
same region. We have not controlled for the sex and age of the irregular workers, or the size of the 
firms, because we did not have enough samples of irregular workers in many of the hypothetical cells.   
According to our estimation results, the employer’s contribution rate variable has a statistically 
significant (at 5 % confidence level) negative coefficient in the relative wage rate equation of regular 
workers. Thus, the gap between the wages of regular workers and irregular workers narrows as a 
result of an increase in employer's social insurance contribution rate. According to the results in (1) 
and (2), such an increase in employer's contributions will have little effect on the wage rate of regular 
workers, but it will increase the demand for the irregular workers and hence their wage rate. Thus, 
the wage gap between regular and irregular workers decreases.   
 
Legally, employers can share the burdens of health care insurance and long term care insurance 
equally with the employees, but, in significant number of firms, they pay more than half of the total 
insurance  contributions,  paying  all of the total contributions in an extreme case.  In general, 
employers  prefer  to stick to the legal lower  limit,  employees prefer  to have their employer to 
contribute at higher rates, and the outcome may depend on the relative bargaining power of the two. 
The wage rate may depend on the relative bargaining power of the two, too. Consequently, the 
variable, the employer's contributions, may be not be exogenous, being possibly correlated with the 
error term of the wage rate (or relative wage rate) equation.   
In order to deal with the endogeneity problem of the employer's contribution variable, we have used 
previous year's contribution rate and the proportion of the elderly in the enrollment of the insurance 
association as our instruments. We have shown the IV estimation results in column (4), column (5) 
and column (6). Coefficients of employer’s contribution are larger in the IV estimation than those    of 
OLS estimation given by (1), (2) and (3), respectively.   
 
6.  Summary 
In this paper, we analyzed  the  empirical incidence of employer’s contributions  for health . 
Particularly, we focus on those for health care and long term care insurance. Previous works that 
have estimated the empirical evidence of social insurance burdens in Japan have not used micro 
wage data, but used  aggregated  wage data. From our  estimation results, we have not found 
statistically significant negative effect on  regular  workers wage rates, but  found statistically 
significant negative effect on relative wage rates of regular workers to those of irregular workers. 
Thus, we conceive that employer’s contribution leads to substitution of regular workers by irregular 
workers, reduces the relative wage rate of regular workers to irregular workers, and finally reduces 
the labor income.    
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Table 1 Explanation of variables 
 
 
shotoku  annual income 
wage_h  wage rate per hours  （10,000 yen） 
age  age 
age2  square of age 
keizokunen  number of months worked for the current firm 
shuugyounisu  yearly days worked   
shuugyoujikansu  week working hours   
sex  male=1, female=0 
dist_dum1  district dummy  （hokkaido･tohoku） 
dist_dum2  district dummy  （kanto） 
dist_dum3  disutrict dummy  （hokuriku・tokai） 
dist_dum4  district dummy  （kinki） 
dist_dum5  district dummy  （chugoku・shikoku） 
dist_dum6  district dummy  （kyusyu・okinawa） 
gakureki1  education dummy  （elementary school・junior high school） 
gakureki2  education dummy  （high school） 
gakureki3  education dummy  （junior college・technical college） 
gakureki4  education dummy  （college・graduate school） 
fhrate_w  employer's contribution rate in per mill   
roken_w  contribution for health care of aged  （yen） 
rojin_w  enrollment rate of aged person 
hyojun_w  standard monthly remuneration  （yen） 
unemp_yd  unemployment rate 
dyear92  year dummy (1992) 
dyear97  year dummy (1997) 
dyear02  year dummy (2002) 
lag_fhrate  employr's contribution rate in previous period 
lwage_h  log of wage rate 
wagep  ratio of wage rate to the average wage rate of irregular workers 
lwagep  log of wagep 
hyojunp  average standard monthly remuneration divided by average wage rate 
of irregular workers 
lhyojunp  log of hyojunp 
rokenph  contribution for health care of the elderly divided by standard 
monthly remuneration  
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Table 2    Descriptive Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sex 130443 0.233113 0.422815 0 1
age 130443 38.93983 11.17114 16 80
keizokunen 130443 26.18883 8.214349 0 30
shuugyounisuu 130443 230.0476 20.94192 25 250
shuugyoujikan 130443 45.11034 7.797244 7.5 60
shotoku 130443 586.8774 299.8032 25 1500
wage_h 130443 0.295475 0.232068 0.008333 40
dist_dum1 130443 0.084267 0.277788 0 1
dist_dum2 130443 0.345001 0.475371 0 1
dist_dum3 130443 0.200057 0.400044 0 1
dist_dum4 130443 0.153968 0.360919 0 1
dist_dum5 130443 0.123709 0.329251 0 1
dist_dum6 130443 0.092999 0.290431 0 1
gakureki1 130443 0.070314 0.255677 0 1
gakureki2 130443 0.521684 0.499532 0 1
gakureki3 130443 0.108262 0.310712 0 1
gakureki4 130443 0.297739 0.457266 0 1
fhrate_w 130443 48.30265 5.14603 0 76.75071
roken_w 130443 957164.3 1810159 0 9618349
rojin_w 130443 2.840256 0.924435 0.52 7.54
hyojun_w 130443 346157.9 43164.01 215128 482368.7
unemp_yd 130443 3.299365 1.356721 1.6 6.7
dyear92 130443 0.382389 0.485973 0 1
dyear97 130443 0.353679 0.478113 0 1
dyear02 130443 0.263931 0.440764 0 1
lag_fhrate 80563 47.81489 6.130647 0 76.75071
lwage_h 130443 -1.37479 0.555921 -4.78749 3.688879
age2 130443 1641.104 892.4652 256 6400
lwagep 130443 0.591292 0.575979 -3.30464 5.792193
hyojunp 130443 2508108 532914.8 450343.3 7054197
lhyojunp 130443 14.71276 0.214053 13.01777    5.76913





  Table 3 Estimation results (OLS estimation） 
(1) (2) (3)
lwage_h lwagep lwagep
coefficient standard deviation coefficientstandard deviation coefficientstandard deviation
fhrate_w -0.000143 0.000316 fhrate_w -0.0007 0.000321 ** fhrate_w -0.0022 0.00032 ***
rokenph 0.002277 0.000285 ***
lhyojunp 0.513279 0.011364 ***
age 0.0776751 0.00072 *** age 0.07728 0.00073 *** age 0.077338 0.000724 ***
age2 -0.0006689 8.97E-06 *** age2 -0.00066 9.10E-06 *** age2 -0.00067 9.02E-06 ***
sex -0.3228261 0.003023 *** sex -0.32114 0.003064 *** sex -0.32238 0.00304 ***
keizokunen 0.0105013 0.000229 *** keizokunen 0.010286 0.000232 *** keizokunen 0.010251 0.00023 ***
gakureki2 0.2277141 0.004489 *** gakureki2 0.226981 0.004551 *** gakureki2 0.227054 0.004515 ***
gakureki3 0.3248698 0.00562 *** gakureki3 0.323252 0.005697 *** gakureki3 0.322343 0.005652 ***
gakureki4 0.3888203 0.004904 *** gakureki4 0.388407 0.004972 *** gakureki4 0.38707 0.004932 ***
unemp_yd -0.0074533 0.00451 * unemp_yd 0.00828 0.004572 * unemp_yd 0.00983 0.004546 **
dist_dum1 0.0155956 0.005298 *** dist_dum1 0.009105 0.005371 * dist_dum1 0.020839 0.005336 ***
dist_dum2 0.1302939 0.005605 *** dist_dum2 0.143188 0.005683 *** dist_dum2 0.066299 0.005897 ***
dist_dum3 0.067699 0.0075 *** dist_dum3 0.099571 0.007603 *** dist_dum3 0.051114 0.007621 ***
dist_dum4 0.1219917 0.004803 *** dist_dum4 0.104979 0.004869 *** dist_dum4 0.040093 0.005066 ***
dist_dum5 0.0202207 0.006151 *** dist_dum5 0.038461 0.006236 *** dist_dum5 0.027658 0.006196 ***
dyear97 0.0721883 0.005882 *** dyear97 0.013402 0.005963 ** dyear97 0.00188 0.006136
dyear02 0.1225421 0.014744 *** dyear02 0.034939 0.014947 ** dyear02 0.009543 0.014876
cons -3.861757 0.040874 *** cons -3.15564 0.041438 *** cons -9.88891 0.154199 ***
Numbe of sample 130443 130443 130443
Adj R-squared 0.5092 0.5301 0.5377
F value 2820.36 3066.4 3033.56
Prob > F 0 0 0
note 1）***, ** and * express that coefficient statistically differ from 0 at siginificant leve of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
note 2）cons is constant term   
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  Table 4 Estimation results (IV estimation) 
(4) (5) (6)
lwage_h lwagep lwagep
coefficientstandard deviation coefficientstandard deviation coefficientstandard deviation
fhrate_w -0.00102 0.000999 fhrate_w -0.00529 0.001012 *** fhrate_w -0.00403 0.001109 ***
rokenph 0.220056 0.043919 ***
lhyojunp 0.530188 0.016009 ***
age 0.075431 0.000958 *** age 0.075268 0.00097 *** age 0.075206 0.000963 ***
age2 -0.00065 1.18E-05 *** age2 -0.00065 0.000012 *** age2 -0.00065 1.19E-05 ***
sex -0.31817 0.003818 *** sex -0.31638 0.003866 *** sex -0.31774 0.003836 ***
keizokunen 0.011056 0.000242 *** keizokunen 0.010828 0.000245 *** keizokunen 0.01073 0.000243 ***
gakureki2 0.208168 0.006141 *** gakureki2 0.208944 0.006218 *** gakureki2 0.208508 0.00617 ***
gakureki3 0.30012 0.007388 *** gakureki3 0.299748 0.007481 *** gakureki3 0.298998 0.007425 ***
gakureki4 0.362237 0.006591 *** gakureki4 0.363748 0.006673 *** gakureki4 0.362329 0.006623 ***
unemp_yd -0.00532 0.005935 unemp_yd 0.013052 0.006009 ** unemp_yd 0.008054 0.005991
dist_dum1 0.017223 0.00691 ** dist_dum1 0.014668 0.006997 ** dist_dum1 0.037142 0.007016 ***
dist_dum2 0.117647 0.009236 *** dist_dum2 0.108788 0.009352 *** dist_dum2 0.075658 0.008771 ***
dist_dum3 0.053352 0.011787 *** dist_dum3 0.081342 0.011934 *** dist_dum3 0.05413 0.011506 ***
dist_dum4 0.106382 0.007156 *** dist_dum4 0.075223 0.007246 *** dist_dum4 0.046691 0.006996 ***
dist_dum5 0.024494 0.009118 *** dist_dum5 0.029653 0.009232 *** dist_dum5 0.036786 0.008994 ***
dyear97 -0.05631 0.01246 *** dyear97 -0.02228 0.012616 * dyear97 -0.02005 0.01258
cons -3.59579 0.073851 *** cons -2.68638 0.074774 *** cons -9.93481 0.219424 ***
Numbe of sample 80563 80563 80563
Instrument  variable lag_fhrate, rojin_w lag_fhrate, rojin_w lag_fhrate, rojin_w
Centered R2 0.5072 0.5376 0.5445
F value 1763.28 1996.83 1966.36
Prob > F 0 0 0
note 1）***, ** and * express that coefficient statistically differ from 0 at siginificant leve of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively





Figure 1 Effects of employer’s contribution and labor markets of regular and 
irregular workers 
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